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Abstract 
 
This paper provides an overview of an idea that has been percolating in Indonesia for 
several years, the creation of a long-term bond market for the subnational governments. 
The revised law PP 30 sets out the parameters for long-term borrowing by regional 
governments in which long-term loans made to the Public are more restricted. Although a 
set of legal requirements have been instituted, there are still several challenges in 
developing subnational bonds in Indonesia. The main question is whether subnational 
governments have interest and capacity in issuing municipal bonds. Lack of budget 
transparency, accountability and experience in managing debt are a concern in addition to 
a number of issues related to financial mechanics of subnational budget. This paper is to 
make a case for financial intermediation and oversight for the smaller subnational 
borrowers by establishing a bond bank.  
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2 
Introduction 
            
The advent of subnational bonds in Indonesia can be viewed from three directions. The 
first is that of mobilizing capital to meet the country’s well-documented needs for 
increased infrastructure investment. The second is that exposing regional governments to 
the private capital markets will help develop their planning and managerial capacities. 
The third is that the introduction of subnational government’s credits will help stimulate 
the development of a credit markets in Indonesia.1  The extension of credit to subnational 
governments through the domestic (private) capital markets via the sale of regional bonds 
brings a host of consideration.  Credit by its very nature runs through time and thus 
elements of financial stability and fiscal predictability loom large in judging 
creditworthiness and, hence, marketability of securities. For the last decade, these 
attributes seemed in short supply in Indonesia, as both the governmental and financial 
sectors were in turmoil. As of late, Indonesia’s economic and fiscal performance has 
greatly improved and its stature in the global capital markets has risen markedly.   
            
In this paper, we first review the rapid fiscal decentralization of government, which 
started in 2001, which came in the wake of the “Asian Flu” financial crisis that struck in 
the late 1990s. In the process of decentralization, Indonesia’s intergovernmental structure 
changed rapidly, as responsibilities (and much of the workforce) was transferred to the 
subnational governments. But, subsequently, Indonesia was largely unaffected by the 
2007-08 financial crisis, and by the end of the decade was moving steadily forward with 
sustained growth in its GDP and benefitting by political stability.  
           
Next, we will update the current discussions as to creating a regional bond market in 
Indonesia. This discussion will be based on a survey and critique of the latest Indonesian 
laws and regulations as they pertain to the issuance of subnational bonds and related 
issues regarding the mechanics of the issuance process.  Particularly helpful are the recent 
views expressed by the credit rating agencies in their recent reviews of the candidate 
regional government credits.  
             
Finally, we will make some international comparisons between Indonesia’s approach to 
enhanced subnational borrowing and that of other emerging economies. In particular, we 
will examine the problems of scale and sophistication of the borrowers. We will make the 
case for the usefulness of financial intermediation and oversight for the smaller 
subnational borrowers provided by a bond bank. That would allow those borrowers to 
enjoy the benefits of broader markets for their credit, but lessen their exposure to the risks 
of “going it alone’ in the capital markets.  
 
 
                                                           
1
 By subnational government we mean all those below the sovereign (state).  This terms” local,” regional,  
and “subnational” are all used here interchangeably and includes provinces, cities and districts. Distinctions 
among government types (provinces, regencies (Kabupaten), and cities (Kota) will be made in context. The 
abbreviated expression ‘kabupaten/kota” will be used to distinguish the regencies and municipalities as a 
group.     
3 
Overview of Governmental Structure and Fiscal Capacity  
 
Indonesia is a unitary state that in the past decade has moved swiftly toward 
decentralization.2  Overall, the government sector is not very large by international 
standards, with its expenditures representing about 19 percent of GDP.  Ratio of Central 
Government Debt to GDP is slightly below 30%. Looking at the composition of 
Indonesian debt that has declined since 2002 due to the robust growth of GDP, domestic 
debt continues to be larger than external debt. Fiscal sustainability has also been 
improved from the peak of the 1997 crisis as the budget deficit decreased significantly. 
 
 
 
              Fig. 1. Indonesian National Debt, 2001-2011                     Fig. 2. Government Budget Deficit, 1994-2010 
 
The intergovernmental system has undergone a dramatic transformation.  
Decentralization meant sending many functions (and employees) down to the local level, 
not infrequently with considerable confusion as to who is responsible for their 
performance.  It has also led to dramatically restructuring the intergovernmental transfer 
system to provide the local units with more revenues.3  
 
Nationwide, as a result of the decentralization there is a high-degree of dependency by 
the regional governments on central government transfers in the form of shared taxes and 
grants, which make up around 83% of total revenues.  But, these intergovernmental 
transfers vary greatly among the subnational units, some of which do have significant 
own-source revenues. Localities have great differences in appetites for taxes and the 
ability to levy many different types of taxes. A source of friction has been the practice by 
some localities of levying a variety of “nuisance’ taxes that inhibited domestic trade and 
that had prejudicial impacts.  Among the many reforms instituted was one to rein in the 
power of local governments to levy such taxes.    
 
                                                           
2
 It is divided into 33 provinces, including the special region of Greater Jakarta.  There are about 497 
municipalities: 93 cities (kota) and 404 regencies (rural districts or kabupaten).  Some local services are 
provided by locally owned enterprises, BUMD, of which the PDAMS, the local water districts, are the most 
important.  
3
 Over 2.1 million national level civil servants (over half of them are teachers) were transferred to the 
provincial and local governments in January 2001.  It is important to note that transfers from the center for 
salaries are a priority-spending item under the PAU.  As discussed below, these costs must be netted out in 
tests of revenues available for debt service. 
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4 
Overall, subnational own–source revenues as a percentage of total governmental 
revenues in Indonesia are only about 16.8%. But, subnational expenditures have recently 
been about 37% of total national governmental expenditures or 5.5% of GDP.4 With the 
extensive reassignment of functions to the subnational level, the expenditure share of 
local governments is likely to rise to 40 percent over time. About one-third of local unit 
expenditures were traditionally for developmental purposes, which has only very loosely 
corresponded to capital spending. Improved reporting standards for governments, 
however, are improving on our ability to identify capital spending by local governments.  
 
Table 1.  Indonesian Subnational Budget, 2007-2009 (Rp million) 
 
 
 
Direct capital grants from the central government for capital purposes were sharply 
curtailed in 2001, but the program requirements stayed in place, so that the general 
transfers were in fact used for much the same purposes. Capital spending by governments 
on infrastructure appears to be about 3.5% of GDP annually (World Bank 2007), with the 
bulk of that, while occurring at the local level, remaining to some extent under central 
government control. Thus, in principle, local units have gained much greater autonomy, 
but the implementation of the new discretion power has continued to be an issue and 
there continues to be control from the top.  
 
The tax-sharing system is extensive, with most tax rates of the subnational rates 
controlled at the center. But, even with the uncertainties about required local services and 
meeting national norms, certain individual localities and affiliated enterprises are 
relatively well positioned, and some have taken advantage of their circumstances to raise 
significant revenues. It is also important to bear in mind that the political decentralization 
has been rapid and that there are severe questions regarding the competency, 
professionalism and integrity of operations at the subnational level.     
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 Missing from this figure is data on BUMDs (Regionally Owned Enterprises).  Since these represented 60 
percent of all borrowing from the central government loan funds over the past 25 years, they are no doubt 
major infrastructure providers.  However, 60 percent of loans are in arrears (primarily those to PDAM the 
water utilities), so many are now precluded from borrowing.     
REVENUE (%) (%) (%)
Own-Source Revenue 52,180,254     17.97       64,745,871     17.20      62,354,927    16.80      
General Allocation Funds (DAU) 147,556,504  50.83       176,637,688  46.92      181,475,697 48.89      
Shared Revenue (DBH)* 47,919,319     16.51       78,136,870     20.76      69,091,994    18.62      
Specific Allocation Transfer (DAK) 17,251,289     5.94          21,326,692     5.67         24,884,962    6.70         
Other Resources** 25,455,356     8.77          33,081,001     8.79         48,754,269    13.14      
EXPENDITURE
Total Expenditure 306,618,958  356,779,485  417,184,043 
Capital Expenditure 89,552,625     29.21       97,300,708     27.27      110,102,489 26.39      
* Shared Taxes and Natural Resources Revenues
* Including Grants, Special Autonomy Funds and Shared Revenues with other regions
2007 2008 2009
5 
 
 
    Fig. 3. Subnational Own-Source Revenue, 2009-2011          Fig. 4. Subnational Capital Expenditure, 2009-2011 
 
  
Subnational Borrowing Powers 
   
Under existing law, subnational governments nominally were given the power to borrow 
from several sources.  But, effectuation of that law was repeatedly held up by the central 
government.  There have been prescribed parameters that limit the types and use of debt.5 
In practice, what borrowing that has been done by subnational units has been almost 
exclusively through government on-lending programs and, only on occasion, through 
regional banks owned by local governments or other private sources.6 Moreover, 
subnational governments (but not their enterprises) have been (temporarily) prohibited 
from borrowing from non-governmental sources.7  Thus, while a subnational government 
borrowing superstructure was put in place nearly a decade ago, the whole borrowing 
process was effectively put “on hold” and rudderless without the implementing 
regulations being adopted.  There are numerous gaps in the regulations governing 
borrowing, but until a new set of regulations are promulgated and allowed to go forward, 
these will not appear and need to be ironed out in the process of doing a borrowing, such 
as a bond issue.  
 
Almost all regional borrowing the past few years has been from central governmental 
sources and it has been very limited.  There has been no tradition for governments 
borrowing in the bond markets or from the commercial banking system.  Overall, given 
the uncertainty of the rapid change, local general units of government have been viewed 
as not financially responsible.  Borrowing was restricted to central government 
                                                           
5
 The substance of the restrictions (which are discussed later) are that long-term loans are for self-
supporting infrastructure projects, not for expenditure or general O&M, net annual borrowing is not to 
exceed 75% of General revenue in the previous year’s budget (with a minimum DSCR of 2.5). Short-term 
loans are not to exceed 1/6th of general revenue of the current year.  Local units cannot guarantee loans of 
other parties and public assets cannot be used as security to obtain Local government loans (Law 25/99 as 
amended and PP 107).   
6
 It may have been the case that some local units enter into installment sale contracts as a way to 
circumvent restrictions on borrowing.  In any event there appears to be little borrowing from the private 
sector or, as of late, from the central government. On the contrary, regional governments have seen their 
reserves build up and have been lenders to the rest of the Indonesian economy.  
7
 Implementation regulations for local borrowing power were held up repeatedly during the decade that 
followed decentralization.  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
North 
Sumatra
West 
Sumatra -
Riau
South 
Sumatra -
Lampung
Jakarta West Java -
Banten
Central 
Java -
Yogyakarta
East Java Bali - Nusa 
Tenggara
Kalimantan Sulawesi -
Papua
Sumatra DKI Java East Indonesia
% Own-Source 
Revenue
2009 2010 2011
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
North 
Sumatra
West 
Sumatra -
Riau
South 
Sumatra -
Lampung
Jakarta West Java -
Banten
Central 
Java -
Yogyakarta
East Java Bali - Nusa 
Tenggara
Kalimantan Sulawesi -
Papua
Sumatra DKI Java East Indonesia
% Capital Expenditure 2009 2010 2011
6 
administered loan funds that were sourced by donor funds.  Earlier efforts were made 
before the crises of 1997 to commence a “revenue bond” municipal market based on 
selected water utilities, as a separate sector in the country’s small bond market.  But these 
efforts came to naught at the time of the 1997 crisis.  Local-government-owned banks 
(BPD) issued bonds with the aggregate amount of Rp 1.2 billion during 1990s and 
appeared to have served as financial conduits for some sub-sovereign borrowings. As 
noted, subnational governments were barred from borrowing (as part of the IMF loan 
agreements).  While municipal enterprises evidently can continue to borrow from private 
sources, but such borrowing appears to have been minimal.  It appears that loans have 
been made to and equity investments made in local enterprises.8  
 
A legacy (and a persistent political problem) of the central government administered 
lending programs has been the large amount in loan arrearages, which has tainted both 
the resumption of on-lending and the creation of private lending avenues.9   
 
 
Budgeting and Management Capacity 
   
The decentralization and devolution of power created great changes and turmoil in local 
finances over the past decade.  It brought a host of new employees (central employees 
transferred to the local units) to the local level and an array of service responsibilities that 
are not well defined. Local governments (and their elected leaders) are having now to 
acquire management and financial skills ex post facto. A wide variety of international 
programs have been introduced to support the effort but those programs themselves are in 
the formative stages and the needed framework of laws and regulation is only slowly, and 
imperfectly, being erected.     
         
Over the years, reports from the filed have been skeptical as to the technical competency 
and integrity of local financial administration in many places.  At a minimum, there is a 
need for extensive professional training and technical assistance and there a number of 
multinational programs in place to attempt that.  But the other reality is that new credit 
programs that depend on local administration will require strong monitoring.  The Asian 
Development Bank, the World Bank and USAID have been involved in projects to 
support decentralization, including capacity building and investment financing for 
selected local governments.  For reasons discussed below, the local enterprises (BUMDs 
and especially the water utilities – PDAMs) have been and continue to be of much 
concern.  While they are logical targets for such assistance, the extensive defaults 
experienced under the central on-lending program served as a large impediment to their 
renewed borrowing.  
   
                                                           
8
 See Lewis and Oosterman (2010).  
9
 Re-instituting donor-backed loan funds (RDA and SLA) proved to be contentious. The central 
government did not want to provide a sovereign guaranty and has been unable to resolve the massive 
defaults by local units.  While Law 25/99 and PP107 did allow local units to access donor loans directly, 
most of the donor community rejected the structure of such direct lending and advocated on-lending 
through the central government due to poor record of loan repayment and lack of local fiscal capacity. At 
the end of 2004 over 50% of total amounts due for RDA and SLA loans were in arrears.  
7 
Financial Reporting and Accountability 
   
As a unitary state, all expenditures and revenues are theoretically centrally reported. 
There has been a system of local reporting that was essentially top down using the old 
prefecture system (central government employees at the local level kept the accounts).  
There has been a major effort to design and effectuate a new reporting system, including 
new accounting standards and the mapping of fiscal capacity of regional governments.10 
But, the decentralization process has caused problem of co-ordination and authority.  
 
An issue that needs to be emphasized is that such reporting practices be designed to meet 
emerging credit market needs.  Earlier versions of local government reporting standards 
(which were based on the Old Dutch colonial system) were strictly on a cash basis and 
did not report the balance sheet.  In the mid-2000s, regulations moved toward a modified 
accrual basis, although many local units were still reporting on the old format.  To further 
confuse matters, new governmental accounting standards have been adopted that require 
a move to full accrual system by 2008, a development that will likely sow future 
confusion.  The independence and quality of local audits are unknown and it appears that 
the central government auditing of local governments may not be operative.   
    
 
Financial Emergency and Defaults 
  
In the absence of data and without much local government commercial (e.g. private 
market) debt outstanding, there is at present no framework for identifying or process for 
curing local unit financial emergencies.  Under the old on-lending framework, the 
national government assumed ultimate responsibility of the debt, most of which is owed 
to donor institutions. The on-lending programs were not legally secured and the national 
government, albeit having the power to intercept payments to regional governments, was 
unwilling to effectuate it to recover owed monies.  The abilities of creditors to enforce 
covenants (or that of localities to have legal firewalls for the provision of basic services) 
are unfamiliar and untested concepts. Clarification is needed of the ability to pledge 
future revenues to nongovernmental creditors to recover it of paramount concern.  
Although there exists the capacity to intercept central payments for debt service, that 
power is restricted to central government debt and the government, in the face of large 
scale default, was been unwilling to exercise it. The judicial system is seen as one of the 
weakest points in Indonesia.     
 
Governments that run into insolvency are evidently eligible for emergency assistance 
from the center.  However, the basis for such assistance (grants) is uncertain and not 
subject to any uniform standards.  This plasticity in assistance is a holdover of the old 
unitary state concept of paternalism and can represent a source of moral hazard.  
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 Early on in decentralization, financial reporting oversight of subnational governments was divided. The 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) had double systems and are 
engaged in developing the regulations concerning reporting.  As of 2005, all units are required to use 
accrual form accounting and to report within 8 months of the close of the fiscal year. See Lewis and 
Oosterman (2010).   
8 
Banking and Financial Markets 
  
Indonesia has a bank-dominated financial system, which was severely mauled by the 
1997 crisis.  Most of the formerly private banking system was bailed out under IMF 
supervision by the central government, which faced with the problem of working out 
non-performing loans. Meanwhile, bank balance sheets at the time of crisis were loaded 
with government bonds and thus new lending (or capital market activity) was minimal 
through the mid-2000s.11  The country has a limited array of institutional investors 
(pension systems and retirement funds) that traditionally had invested primarily in bank 
savings certificates and government bonds.  There was however, a capital market 
superstructure in place (banks, dealers, rating agency, etc.), two active stock exchanges, 
and a market regulatory mechanism. Overall, bank loans are equal to only 25 percent of 
GDP and outstanding (traded) bond issues are 1 per cent of GDP.    
  
 
 
        Fig. 5. Stock Exchange Performance, 2009-2011                          Fig. 6. Market Activities, 2009-2011 
  
 
Financial Market, Institutions Regulation and Taxation 
   
Regulation of the financial markets is concentrated in BAPEPAM.  Bond issues that are 
to be listed on the exchanges must undergo a lengthy registration process and must 
receive a credit rating.  This process probably renders the existing listed bond market as 
infeasible for all except major issuers.  In the past, there was discussion of an over-the-
counter market (trading among dealers) as such a market plays the major part in the 
secondary bond transactions in many developed countries.  But, as we will discuss below, 
a financial intermediary such as a domestic “bond bank,” might tap the listed market.  A 
few years ago, BAPEPAM was chary of municipal bonds and, especially, concerned 
about the secondary market apparatus and transparency. 
 
The financial sector and capital markets in Indonesia have changed rapidly and there is 
limited, but increasing, information on the players. The regulation of the financial 
institutions other than banks involves regulating the insurance companies (banks are 
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 Moody’s in 2005 rated the Indonesian banking system at 3 out of possible 100 in terms of bank financial 
strength (Argentina is 0). Recently, Indonesian largest bank ratings have been rising rapidly and are now 
considered investment grade. “Nine Indonesian Banks Upgraded by Moody’s. Bisnis (January11, 2012). 
http://en.bisnis.com/articles/nine-indonesian-banks-have-ratings-upgraded-by-moodys.    
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9 
evidently prohibited from holding non-state bonds), which represent a major potential 
source of funds. Pension funds and insurance companies have been largely limited to 
holding bank savings certificates and government bonds, but their portfolios have been 
expanding.  Bank capital adequacy requirements could be an issue as it relates to their 
treatment of subnational securities; that is, are they to be treated as “governmental debt” 
or “private debt” according to the prudential guidelines.  Regulation of non-bank 
institutions is being centralized in BAPEPAM.  
  
  
Credit Analysis and Ratings 
  
The largest and best known credit rating agency in Indonesia is Pefindo, which was 
established in 1994. Pefindo has worked with the major international rating agencies. 
Although it was approached in the past for purposes of providing local government 
enterprise ratings (PDAM), it has never done so.  In view of the disaster in financial 
markets and the large number of defaults at the end of the 1990s, the agency was 
criticized for its lack of care in examining balance sheets and, in particular, exposures to 
exchange risk.  The lack of experience (both of the potential borrowers and the raters), 
early efforts at credit analysis will be frankly experimental. The ability to do comparative 
analysis will be hindered if a general and useful reporting system for subnational 
governments is not in place.  Fitch Investors Service opened a local office in 2008. To 
date, both agencies have focused on corporate credits. Meanwhile, Standard and Poor’s 
has been cultivating a local market with its analysis of regional government financial 
management.      
  
 
An Updated Assessment 
   
The rapid devolution of government power and fiscal resources and the turmoil amid 
sorting out roles and responsibilities has created fiscal (and political) uncertainties but 
seems destined to move more decision-making and resources to the regions and localities. 
Undecided is the basic policy design of how local governments are to meet their 
infrastructure financing responsibilities.  Despite the early difficulties, Indonesia is a 
country of considerable wealth, evidences a high saving rate and appears large enough to 
support a domestic credit market.  The banking system and the financial markets have 
recovered from the crisis of the late 1990’s.  As of late, the Indonesian economy has been 
showing consistent growth and appears to have a solid macro-economic framework.  
Conditions seem favorable for the meeting of public capital needs (particularly for 
infrastructure), which should move to center stage.  
 
Given the heritage of central control and the inexperienced and untested skills at the local 
government level, there will need to be a substantial institutional commitment to 
accomplish that transition. The legal requirements and adequate resources of a local bond 
market would help, not only as a means of mobilizing capital, but as way to better 
allocated that capital to competing needs. It would create a continuing need for 
information and extra governmental demands for disclosure and managerial competency. 
10 
These demands would stem from the investors self-interest and they will insist on the 
timely and complete provision of information as a means of enforcing market discipline.  
 
It has often been recommended that the Ministry of Finance sponsor a special financing 
vehicle that would act as a “bond bank” and generally act on “market-based” principles.  
Sponsorship and operation can take on number of forms, but the critical matter is that it 
be a market-oriented entity and not be sabotaged by another generation of concessional 
on-lending programs. There are a variety of models internationally, as will be discussed 
briefly below.  The actual operation might be undertaken by a commercial bank.  
Indonesia appears at a policy crossroad in terms of trying to move local units to a system 
that would instill commercial principles into lending decisions and have sufficient “teeth” 
to assure borrower compliance with the conditions of commercial-based contracts.   
 
Associated with the reform effort is the need to reform various PDAM water utilities, 
many of which are in arrears on outstanding on-lent debt.  The self-supporting nature of 
these entities and the prospect of providing them with greater insulation from “day-to-
day” politics (plus their need to resolve arrearages) might make them candidates for loans 
under a reformed program.  This appears to be public finance issue, and not specifically 
on sub-sovereign along these lines, but thought needs to be given early on procurement 
and contract-enforcement issues, in particular the use of independent engineers and 
trustees.  
 
Among the infrastructure sectors, transportation is the greatest importance.  Capital 
spending for transportation to have been running about Rps 60 trillion a year in spending 
and government plans call for those amounts to be about doubled. In each case, the 
government has hopes of significant reliance on increased user charges and the use of 
borrowings secured on the self-supporting projects.  However, in the water sector, 
resistance to rate increases has been a huge political problem, and water rates are held at 
low levels. In the 1990s, Indonesia had extensive investments in private concession and 
BOT toll roads and evidently would like to reinstate a large program mobilizing private 
capital.  As noted, Indonesian municipal bonds would evidently be limited to funding 
revenue-generating uses.  
 
 
 
 Fig. 7. Infrastructure Investments, 2001-2009                 Fig. 8. Investments on Public Utilities & Construction, 
2009-2011 
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Power to Borrow and Borrowing Process 
 
The power to borrow by local governments is subject to the provisions of the law - PP 30 
in Indonesia. In the following we examine the provisions if this law and the 
accompanying regulations.  Article 14 of PP 30 sets out the parameters for long-term 
borrowing by regional governments.  Such borrowing is defined as those loans with an 
original maturity of more than one-year. These loans may originate from (that is, be made 
by) by the Central Government, other Regional Governments, banks and financial 
institution, and the public. A distinction is made between loans originating from the 
public and the institutional lenders. The Long-term loans originating from the 
Government, other Regional Governments, banks and financial institution may be used to 
finance infrastructure and/or public facilities investment activities that do the following:  
 
a. generate direct income in the form of revenues for APBD in relation to the 
development of such infrastructure and facilities; 
b. generate indirect income in the form of savings in APBD expenditures 
which should be spent if those activities are not engaged; and/or 
c. provide economic and social benefits.12  
 
However, long-term loans made to the Public are more restricted. These shall be utilized 
to finance infrastructure and/or facilities investment in public service activities that 
generate income earned from the levies over the usage of those infrastructure and 
facilities.13  In other words, publicly offered bonds must be revenue-generating, at least 
for nominally self-liquidating projects. But there appears no requirement that the 
revenues be specifically pledged to the repayment of the debt.  PP 30 goes on to set out 
conditions for regional lending, including limitations on debt that may be incurred.  
 
In undertaking borrowing, the Regional Governments are limited to the amount of debt 
then outstanding debt plus the amount of loan to be undertaken, which in total shall not 
exceed 75% (seventy-five percent) of the amount of general revenues in their APBD of 
the preceding year.14  Moreover, the regional governments shall meet the conditions for 
the ratio of regional financial capacities to repay the loan stipulated by the Government 
(Minister of Finance) and other conditions as are stipulated by prospective lenders.15 
Last, “in the event of Regional Loans submitted to the Government, the Regional 
Governments shall also be required to pay off any loan repayment arrears [for loans] 
originating from the Government”16. 
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 PP 30 (draft) Art. 14 (4). 
13
 PP 30 (draft) Art. 14 (5). 
14
 PP 30 Art. 15 (1). 
15
 In Article 16, the Minister of Finance shall determine the value of regional financial capacity ratio to 
repay the loan as specified in Article 15   “The determination of the value of regional financial capacity 
ratio to repay the loan as intended in paragraph (1) shall be a minimum of 2.5 (two point five) by taking 
into account of the national economic development and regional fiscal capacity.”   
16
 PP 30 draft Art 15 (3).  It is not clear if submission means just for approval on in the case of a loan to be 
made by the government.  
12 
Chapter VI of PP 30 sets out a separate chapter dedicated to regional bonds.  Regional 
Governments may issue bonds insofar as that they meet the conditions for loans as 
stipulated in Article 15 (discussed above), government regulations and the provisions of 
laws and regulations in the field of capital market. The issuance of Regional Bonds shall 
only be done the domestic capital market and shall be denominated in Rupiah. Moreover, 
regional bonds shall be securities issued by the Regional Governments and shall not be 
secured by the Government.17   
 
Regional bonds shall be used only to finance infrastructure and/or public service facilities 
investment activities that generate income for APBD that is “acquired from a levy on the 
use of the infrastructure and facilities.”18  Thus, bonds are only to be of a “revenue bond” 
nature, evidently of the self-liquidating variety. An interesting proviso has to do with the 
contemplated use of a trustee in the case of bonds. Article 43 indicates that the bond loan 
agreement shall be set out in a trustee agreement and [the agreement] shall be executed 
by the governor, regent, or mayor and Trustee as the proxy of the bondholders/lenders.19 
 
The Chapter goes on to specify that the bond loan agreement shall at least include 
following: 
a. nominal value; 
b. maturity date; 
c. interest payment date; 
d. interest rate (coupon); 
e. frequency of interest payment; 
f. method of calculation on interest payment; 
g. provisions concerning the right to repurchase the Regional Bonds prior to 
the maturity date; and 
h. provisions concerning transfer of ownership.  
 
The procedures for the issuance process of regional bonds are next laid out. The Regional 
Bond Issuance Plan shall be submitted to the Minister of Finance after obtaining an 
approval of the Regional People's Legislative Assembly. This approval shall include 
principal and interest payment incurred as a result of the issuance of the Regional Bonds, 
the maximum net value of the bond to be issued when determining a regional 
government’s APBD, and the cost of issuance. The Minister shall evaluate the Regional 
Bond issuance plan based on the conditions for loans as intended in Article 15. Last, the 
procedure for the issuance, performance, administration of, and monitoring for the bonds 
shall be subject to the provisions of laws and regulations in the field of capital market. 
 
Article 46 sets out the regional government’s obligations to pay principal and interest of 
any bond when due.20  These debt service payments are to be budgeted annually in APBD 
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 PP 30 Art. 40.  The meaning of “secured” is not clear.  Do the bonds qualify for the use (pledge) of an 
intercept of payments from the central governmental?   
18
 PP 30 Art 42. 
19
 This raises the question of the trustee law in Indonesia. Do corporate borrowers use a trustee in issuing 
bonds?   
20
 Art. 46.  In addition to interest and principal, there is an obligation to pay penalties for a late payment of 
principal and interest. 
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until the end of the liabilities term.  Moreover, these payments shall come from Regional 
revenues originating from income from the activity financed by such regional bonds. 
 
The bonds are evidently “double barrel” obligations, in that regional government APRD 
general revenues can be used to pay the debt service deficiency:  “In event that the 
activity does not generated a sufficient fund to pay principal, interest and Regional Bond 
penalty, the payment liabilities shall be paid from other regional revenues.”21  In the 
event that the due payment liabilities of interest on Regional Bonds exceeds the budgeted 
fund, the governor, regent, or mayor must make a payment in the amount of the due 
liabilities. These payments on Regional Bonds shall be budgeted as an amendment to 
APBD and/or shall be set out in the budget realization report. This provision effectively 
limits the bonds from being “pure” or “straight” revenue bonds where the lenders 
(bondholders) could look only at the project’s assets and the earnings to repay the debt.22  
 
In Article 47 and 48, the management of the bonds is assigned (“shall be conducted by”) 
the governor, regent, or mayor. The management plan consists of planning for and 
conducting the bond sale and the payment of debt service and any repurchase of bonds 
(or, evidently, bond call).  There is also a provision for the sale of the Regional bonds 
through auction. Such management is also subject to further provisions governing 
issuance and for accountability as set forth in Ministerial Regulation.  
 
 
Financial Capacity to Repay Loans 
   
According to the regulations (“Elucidation”) of PP 3023, the financial capacity of a 
regional government for loan repayment is determined by a Debt Service Coverage Ratio 
(DSCR) shall be calculated with the following formula: 
 
DSCR =  {PAD + DAU + (DBH – DBHDR)}– BW  ≥  X 
                          Principal loan + Interest + CE  
 
Where: 
DSCR = Debt Service Coverage Ratio of the related Regional Loan; 
PAD = Pendapatan Asli Daerah (Own-Source Revenue); 
DAU= Dana Alokasi Umum (General Allocation Fund); 
DBH= Dana Bagi Hasil (Profit-Sharing Fund); 
DBHDR= Dana Bagi Hasil Dana Reboisasi (Profit-Sharing Fund of Reforestation Fund);  
BW = Belanja Wajib (Compulsory Expenditures)24 
                                                           
21
 Art 24 (4).   
22
 Such bonds are based on the “special fund” doctrine where the governments are legally empowered to 
create “separate funds” that outside of the general government framework. There debt is not therefore 
counted against the debt of the general government.  
23
 Elucidation of PP 30 (June 2011). 
24
 “Compulsory expenditure” are personnel expenditures and expenditures of the members of Regional 
People’s Legislative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah/DPRD). Other loan-related costs 
include administrative, commitment, provision, insurance costs, and penalty related to Regional Loan. 
  
14 
Principal loan = Installment of Principal loan; 
Interest = Loan Interest Expense; 
BL =Biaya Lain (Other loan-related costs). 
 
DSCR of Regional Governments ≥ X, where X is the Debt Service Coverage Ratio 
(DSCR) determined by the Government.  
 
The draft regulation puts the X at a minimum of 2.5 in Article 16.  The amount of PAD, 
DAU, DBH, DBHDR, and BW shall be calculated from the annual average actual 
amounts (“realization”) of these items for the last 3 (three) years. Principal loan, Interest, 
and Other Costs shall be Loan Liabilities (“debt service”). The amount of Loan Liabilities 
shall be calculated from the annual average of outstanding (un-repaid) previous loan 
liabilities plus the annual average of proposed loan liabilities. 
 
 Fig. 9. Regional Indebtedness 
 
 
 
Table 2. Simulation of Borrowing Capacity for Four-regions with Highest Guaranteed Revenue 
 
 
 
There are several definitional issues that would need to be worked out, although the basic 
idea is clear. What the regulations attempt to do is estimate the “fiscal margin” of 
revenues available for the payment of annual debt service on the debt (after issuance of 
the proposed debt) to new level of debt service.   
Total Govt Debt / GDP
Debt
 0.75 limit on APBD revenues
DSCR limit
APBD revenues  
Layers of Limits on Regional Indebtedness 
National limit of all government debt to 60% of GDP
Debt outstanding not to exceeed 75% of APBD general revenues 
DS = maximum of 0.4 of "Available Funds" 
Debt = (.4 x Available funds) / (Repayment structure & interest factor)  
Province
Own-Source 
Revenue
General 
Allocation 
Fund (DAU)
Profit-
Sharing Fund 
(DBH)
Compulsary 
Expenditure
Guaranteed 
Income 
(Revenue)*
Borrowing Capacity 
(Principal+8% Interest-
2% CI)*
DKI Jakarta 16,022,581  209,900         8,700,000     8,521,389     16,411,092.2  5,967,669.89                    
West Java 10,362,156  19,901,331  3,889,705     19,650,509  14,502,683.1  5,273,702.95                    
East Java 12,613,675  22,004,152  3,632,391     22,294,308  15,955,910.1  5,802,149.14                    
East Kalimantan 3,886,920     3,531,847     16,099,392  6,472,442     17,045,716.1  6,198,442.23                    
* Estimate
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      Fig. 10. Ratio of Debt Limit 
 
 
Capital Spending by Regional Governments 
  
Only recently have the governmental accounting systems in Indonesia been changed so as 
to provide information on capital spending by subnational governments. That has made it 
difficult to track spending on “hard” capital improvements, as opposed to developmental 
expenditures, which have covered a range of activities and served as only a rough proxy 
for capital spending.   
 
Lewis and Oosterman in a 2010 paper reviewing capital spending for a large sample of 
Indonesian Subnational make three points. First, operating balances during the mid-2000s 
exceeded the amount capital spending by subnational governments across all years 
(except for provinces in 2006), which implied that subnational governments finance 
capital spending from operating balances. Second, subnational governments, with 
budgetary surpluses, are net lenders to the rest of the economy. Subnational governments 
accumulated significant cash deposits after decentralization was launched in 2001 and 
this is at least in part a manifestation of that fact. Third, capital spending for subnational 
governments during the interval of 2004 to 2007 steadily increased as a proportion of 
total spending, reaching 22.6 for 22.6 per cent for provinces and 26.7 per cent for 
kabupaten/kota.25 Applying the relevant capital spending shares to the aggregate 
subnational expenditure data indicates that subnational governments spent 1.3 to 1.7 
percent of GDP on capital assets.  When central government capital spending is included, 
the total government capital spending was 2.7 to 3.4 percent of GDP.  
 
Recent analysis suggests that government-wide spending on infrastructure should be   at 
least 5 per cent of GDP in order to secure economic growth of 6 per cent per year. It 
appears that central and subnational governments are not yet meeting that target. “Local 
government spending on buildings and other structures is striking in its relative 
importance. The conventional wisdom in Indonesia is that most of such spending goes to 
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 Subnational governments spent approximately 1.7 per cent of GDP on the acquisition of capital 
assets in 2006. Central government capital expenditure also amounted to 1.7 per cent of GDP for 
those 3 years. In total, consolidated government capital spending was 3.4 percent of GDP in 2006. 
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the construction of government office buildings. Thus, considerable portion of 
kabupaten/kota infrastructure investment is likely, therefore, to be relatively 
unproductive.”26 
 
Generally speaking, therefore, subnational governments in Indonesia have been financing 
capital spending out of cash, either from operating budget balances or by drawing down 
on their reserves. As a result, subnational governments have relied on relatively 
inefficient and inequitable methods of financing investment in infrastructure, particularly 
in the case of a growing economy.  
 
Indonesian subnational governments have accumulated substantial cash reserves in recent 
years. According to Lewis and Oosterman, at the end of 2000, provinces and 
kabupaten/kota held just over Rp 7.4 trillion in reserves. By the end of fiscal year 2008, 
these reserves had grown to approximately Rp 71.2 trillion (about 1.5 per cent of GDP). 
The build-up of subnational reserves appears to have been largely by happenstance: “That 
is, subnationals have not accumulated cash balances with the intent of using them to 
finance capital projects, although they may do so on an as-needed basis.”27 More 
importantly, most subnational governments acquire financial assets in enterprises not 
aimed at public service delivery. BPDs invest most of their funds in treasury notes and 
government bonds, whereas many of the 435 ‘other’ enterprises—the second largest 
groups of recipients of subnational government investment in financial assets—seek to 
provide a commercial service in competition with the private sector counterparts. 
Examples of such enterprises are: airlines, hotels, football teams, insurance companies 
and graphic design bureaus.  
 
In contrast, in 2007 only two provinces and fewer than 10 districts invested funds in 
water utilities, of which there are currently more than 300 (Oosterman, 2009). Indonesian 
subnational government borrowing has been infrequent and for small amounts and nearly 
all has been from the central government and that has a troubled history. From 1975 
through 2004, total subnational borrowing equaled only 0.2 per cent of (2004) GDP in 
nominal terms. Borrowing thus became insignificant following decentralization. Since 
decentralization began in 2001, through the end of 2008 only 10 local governments (and 
no provinces) had taken out long-term loans (from the Ministry of Finance on-lending 
channel) to finance infrastructure.28  Thus, subnational debt to date has played no 
significant part in the decentralization program.   
 
A number of factors have hindered the growth in subnational capital spending in 
Indonesia.  According to Lewis and Oosterman, the subnational government capital 
planning and budgeting process is myopic and “focuses on relatively small investments 
that can be carried out during the course of 1 year.”29 The contracting process is short-
term, tedious, and can be fractious.  Human resources at the subnational government level 
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 See Lewis and Oosterman (2010). 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid.   
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are severely constrained. The education accomplishments and technical skills are at low 
levels, there is a lack of project planning and management capacity and computerization 
is at low levels.  
 
These results underscore that central government should increase its efforts in assisting 
subnational governments to better plan and manage capital projects, particularly those 
major ones that involve public infrastructure.  
 
 
Indonesia Local Government Ratings  
 
In November, there was a presentation by Standard and Poor’s and Pefindo that talked 
about the methodology and early results on their ratings of Indonesian subnational 
borrowers. The results provide insights as to how the credits are perceived and their 
strengths and weaknesses, as well as with the subnational sector in general. The 
overarching finding was that there was a great disparity in administrative capacity at 
different government levels.  In particular, there is a lack of qualified staff and poor 
financial management skills and low computerization, with reliance on manual 
procedures.  The civil service lacks an effective recruitment and compensation system. 
 
Fiscal framework of the county is still evolving.  Expenditure is now decentralized but 
revenue collection still centralized.  The ongoing reforms will continue to affect the 
division of revenues and expenditures.  In the process of reform and decentralization, the 
fiscal guidelines have become better defined over time.  Budget deficits are limited to 6% 
and the outstanding debt stock to 75% of revenue. 
 
But, central transfers (DAU) remain the dominant source of revenue especially for lower 
level governments and the current DAU formula has not improved revenue equalization. 
Previously, large reserves were accumulated, but now the reserves declining while a large 
backlog of infrastructure needs remains. According to the Standard and Poor’s analysis, 
the procurement rules covering projects are onerous and capital expenditure execution 
rates are low.  Regulations now require performance-focus budgeting with medium-term 
projections framework, but so far actual implementation has been low.30  
The analytical framework used by Standard and Poor’s to rate local and regional 
governments consists of combined quantitative and qualitative analysis that involves 
eight major factors.  As is the case with most credit rating agencies, the sovereign rating 
(country rating) usually forms a cap on how high a credit rating for an individual 
subnational unit can obtain.  This is comprehensive national factor is referred to as an 
institutional framework, which can also take into consideration the framework of the 
local governments taken as a sector.  
 
• Institutional Framework – this is the only rating factor that S&P assess on a 
country basis for each level of government. 
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 “Credit Ratings and FMA Findings: DKI Jakarta & Surabaya” Presentation by Yee Farn Phua, Standard 
and Poor’s (Jakarta, November 21, 2011). p.30.  
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The following seven factors are based on the individual characteristics of a local 
government:   
• Economy 
• Financial management 
• Budgetary flexibility 
• Budgetary performance 
• Liquidity 
• Debt burden 
• Contingent liabilities 
 
In addressing the overall institutional framework, Standard and Poor’s indicated that the 
government accounting standards are evolving.  The BPK conducts comprehensive audits 
on local governments; but qualifications of opinions are frequent. Reporting quality and 
frequency vary, with delays in filing results. Public disclosure is limited and, of great 
interest to international investors, publishing these in English is uncommon. With a lack 
of computerization, manual procedures can lead to both inefficiencies and corruption 
 
The legacy has been one of a weak credit culture. Local government borrowing thus far 
has been almost all from the central government. Arrears of this subnational debt remain 
high, mostly from PDAMs. There has been reluctance to repay arrears and to address the 
solvency problems of local SOEs. But overall local government debt levels are very low 
(less than 1% of GDP) and are very manageable, especially in view of the strong reserve 
positions. Bond issuance is now allowed, but no local government has issued bond yet 
and earlier attempts were discouraged by the central government. In case of problems, 
formal bailout procedures and any precedent are lacking.  Standard and Poor’s views the 
likelihood of “extraordinary support” from the central government as “low.”31 
 
In assessing the results, S&P noted that the GDP per capita in Indonesia is significantly 
below that of peer cities in developing countries within the same rating category, but 
noted that the Indonesian cities have higher rates of growth.32  On the negative side, the 
unemployment rate is high due large rural-to-urban migration.  Investments are a 
relatively lower share of expenditures despite large infrastructure gap. Operating margins 
are lower, coupled with high personnel expenditure.  Last, there is high reliance on 
transfers (Surabaya) and a low revenue flexibility given its high reliance on transfers 
from the central government.33 On the positive side, these two governments have 
adequate reserves and low debt levels, which put both cities in a favorable position to 
raise funds for infrastructure investment.34 
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 Phua (2011), p.31  
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 The rating agencies, as customary, allow themselves to mark “up” or “down” a quantitative score based 
on judgment.  
33
 In the area of financial management, both cities were rated by S&P as 4+ on a scale of 5- (weak) to 1 
(very strong). This was considered to be sound to intermediate.   
34
 Phua (2011), p.36 
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Table 3. Credit Weaknesses: Jakarta and Surabaya 
 
DKI Jakarta Surabaya 
ICR: Confidential ICR: BB/stable 
 Liquidity profile is adequate and debt levels are low 
 Commercial center of the country, 
diversified local economy with 
steady growth trend. 
 Economic center of the East Java 
region with diversified local 
economy 
 Strong operating performance, 
although balance after capital 
expenditures may be volatile going 
forward 
 Budgetary performance is adequate 
 Low contingent liabilities 
Source:  Standard and Poor’s Presentation Phua (2011). 
 
As of November 2011, S&P was rating Surabaya as BB and it was not releasing its rating 
on Jakarta. In January of 2012, Moody’s and Fitch both upgraded the sovereign credit of 
Indonesia to Baa and BBB-3, respectively. For the time being S&P continues to carry the 
national credit at BB+.   
 
 
Looking Ahead: A Financial Intermediary for the Subnational Bond Market   
 
As was just discussed, Indonesia appears on the verge of regional bonds being issued. A 
legal and regulatory framework, still untested, is in place and market conditions seem 
most favorable, with the nation’s credit rating and that of its large banks being lifted into 
the creditworthy, investment-grades. As is pointed out in Appendix B, work done a few  
years but likely still relevant (although in need of update) indicated that several provinces 
and kabupaten/kota were likely good candidates for bond issues and improving economic 
and fiscal conditions since then have no doubt extended the list.  
 
On the other hand, as the recent rating agency reports and other research attest, there are 
still several barriers to bonds being sold in the private markets being a feasible alternative 
for most subnational governments. To reiterate the shortcomings, Indonesia has 
institutional problems stemming from the fact it has no track record for regional 
borrowing in the financial markets, the intergovernmental system still is evolving, local 
governments are still highly dependent on intergovernmental transfers, and human and 
managerial capacities to formulate and effectuate investment programs are wanting. 
While these problems are not all related to the size of a government, many are. These 
conditions are not unique to emerging economies and have been addressed in a variety of 
ways. International models are available to providing access to the markets, but 
recognizing that both oversight and technical assistance are very much needed, especially 
the smaller, less sophisticated units.      
 
Governments have many policy choices as to how to address these handicaps that restrict 
capital market access, but in the case of Indonesia the idea of creating a financial 
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intermediary to assist smaller government seems particularly appropriate. While there is 
much detail that could be added, the basic idea is to provide an entry point to the capital 
markets, while avoiding the costs and risks of governments wandering into the bond 
market ignorant of and ill prepared to deal with the demands of the financial markets.  
 
 
Why an Intermediary (“Bond Bank”)? 
  
A common characteristic in an emerging country’s subnational borrowing is that the 
individual loans are small, too small in many cases, to be of interest to the private capital 
markets, which are oriented to larger (and few) commercial borrowers. This market 
situation often commends a pooling of small unit credits into a larger, more efficient 
grouping in order to achieve various economies of scale that are possible with larger 
issuer of bonds.  
 
In addition, pooling brings a reduction in risk through portfolio diversification, resulting 
in reductions in the cost of borrowing to the participating local government borrowers.  
The technique of bond banking, where an intermediating financial entity groups together 
smaller underlying loans, and itself borrows in the financial markets has seen extensive 
use in the developed markets but thus far only limited use in developing country financial 
markets.35    Major difficulties in adoption appear to be reluctance of central government 
on-lending agencies (including government-owned banks) to relinquish control over the 
borrowing by subnational governments and the limited capacity of local markets 
themselves to handle longer-term debt transactions.     
    
The essential relationships in the bond bank approach are depicted in Figure X. The bond 
bank in effect can bundle the underlying subnational debt and then sells its own bonds to 
investors in the capital markets.36  The basic idea behind the pooling concept is to 
develop a portfolio of underlying loans that can then be remarketed in bulk to the 
securities markets as bond bank obligations. Bond bank obligations almost always carry 
with them a variety of enhancements, such as added reserves, various intercept provisions 
and, perhaps, commercial bond insurance. All of these functions benefit from economies 
of scale and the provision of technical expertise.   
 
The pooling concept also provides a number of inherent enhancements in terms of the 
size and diversity of the pool’s portfolio, which serve to protect it against individual 
“event” risks. This means that with appropriate design, a debt service problem with an 
individual borrower can be successfully handled through means of reserve funds, various 
other credit supports, and by the overall pool’s diversity.  Hence, its financial stability 
and mitigation of credit risk add to the protection of the investors. In addition, there are 
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 See John Petersen (2002).  Given their small size and lack of market experience, local government 
issuers face high transaction costs on their individual bond sales. Aside from the economies of scale, the 
bond bank intermediary provides on-going oversight and helps enforce accounting and reporting norms at 
the local government level. The entity can serve as a clearing house for current reporting to the market.      
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 There are legal distinctions between “pools” or “funds” that represent the resale of interests in the 
underlying portfolio and in a “bond banks” that sell their own obligations that represent undivided shares in 
their “business.”  These distinctions can be important in matters of securities regulation and taxation.  
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typically economies of scale that flow to the pooling intermediary, which are especially 
important in the financial markets. These economies include the advantages of scale in 
the original bond offering transaction (which includes such items as legal, advisory, 
investment and trustee fees), and also the credit monitoring and data collection that the 
bond bank does on behalf of the final investors. The TNUDF in India pioneered a credit 
pooling approach in India and is a leading example in emerging markets.   
 
The bond bank concept has seen extensive use in the developed financial markets of 
North America and Europe. It is important to note that the bond bank need not be 
operated as government agency per se, but can be managed under contract by a private 
bank or financial services firm. However, it is important that its legal structure be such as 
that it can enter into agreements with the underlying borrowers to enforce its contracts 
and to allow for an interception of revenues in the case of debt serve payments 
deficiencies by borrowers.  
 
It is clear that bond banks to be effective must work on a commercial basis and as 
institutions must view themselves as part of the financial marketplace rather than as a 
government agency. In that sense they need independence in decision-making and clear 
economic objectives in their operation, and act with transparency. The bond banks are 
almost always small in size in terms of personnel and frequently contract out for 
specialized services.37 They are often administered by individuals that have a private-
sector background in banking and finance.   
 
 
              Fig. 11. Bond Bank (Pooling) 
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Other Countries’ Experience 
  
There are numerous examples in the developed countries of specialized intermediaries 
that are specifically geared toward financing local and regional governments. As noted, 
bond banks are found in the Canadian provinces.  Similar financial intermediaries 
dedicated to subnational governments are found in Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands, 
where state-sponsored local government co-operatives are used to meet local government 
financing needs by borrowing in the markets and then on-lending to individual units.  
Now privatized, but formerly state-owned, specialized banking companies have provided 
for the financing local governments in France, Belgium, Spain and other Western 
European countries. In Europe, there has been a traditional preference for financing local 
government credits (except for the very largest borrowers) through the banking system, 
first with state-owned banks, but later with those banks with special “windows” to meet 
subnational needs.38      
 
Recent European activity is relevant. The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) has operated a Municipal Finance Facility for the EU accession 
countries that on-lends, enhances, and subsidizes maturity extensions for local 
government “municipal” utilities in conjunction with local commercial banks. Loans and 
enhancements are available in either the Euro or local currencies to local banks making 
loans to local governments.  The EBRD has acted as a direct borrower either through 
direct placements or local-currency denominated bond issues in several emerging local 
credit markets, including the Russian Ruble, Polish Zloty, Czech Krona, Hungarian 
Forint, and Estonian Kroon.  The policy was pursued to take advantage of market 
opportunities and to help develop local capital markets.  The domestic currency bond and 
loan proceeds also provide funds for EBRD loans made in the country.39   The Asian 
Development Bank, as well, has issued its own local-currency denominated bonds (in 
India) that provide funds for lending in the local currency and has arranged long-term 
currency swaps (in the Philippine Peso) for purposes of lending to banks that on-lend 
funds for infrastructure borrowers.40   
 
Designing “market-friendly” credit access for subnational governments is not an easy 
task in the context of small, shot-term oriented and very volatile financial markets. Even 
though the markets themselves are primitive, the means of working through them to raise 
long-term capital may need to be sophisticated.  
 
As should also be obvious, so long as donor loans are the cheapest source of capital (and 
the only source of long-term capital) and where no long-term market exists, there is a 
powerful motivation for the sovereign government itself to dominate in the borrowing 
market and leave little capital on the table for the subnational sector. 
 
The majority of bond investors, even in the developed countries, in general are risk 
averse and passive in that they rely heavily on outside credit appraisal (such as credit 
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 See Petersen and Freire (2008), Subnational Credit Markets in Developing Countries pp. 34-35  
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 See “Local Currency Financing” at “www.ebrd.com/markets/investor/local.” 
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 Remarks of Alfredo Pascual (2004).  
23 
ratings). In these cases, a trustee administers the payments and enforcement of the loan 
contracts. The standard practice in the bond guarantee is to provide for the immediate 
payment of full debt service. The LGUGC, the Philippine bond guarantor that is unique 
in the developing markets, provides for such full credit risk guarantees. This is an 
efficient mechanism to separate a credit risk taker (i.e. the guarantor) and the fund 
provider (guaranteed-bond investors). Alternatively, pooling of sub-sovereign credits and 
provision of a reserve for over-collateralization would enable the pool to obtain high 
credit rating and thus improved access to the bond markets.  When banks are dominant 
player in sub-sovereign finance, they can appraise and take the credit risk but cannot 
extend loans with adequate maturity due to deposit-based short-term funding, a second-
tier institution, like FINDETER, can effectively separate a credit risk taker (i.e., 
commercial banks) from the fund source.   
 
Infrastructure finance presents special difficulties in emerging markets because of the 
unavailability of funds for long-term investment. The resulting loans are of much shorter 
duration than the expected life of the improvement.  This places great pressure on taxes 
and charges that attempt to service debt and rapidly recover the capital component. Also, 
commercial banks, the capital base of which is typically based on deposits, are ill suited 
to make long-term loans unless they are provided special (non-market) funds for that 
purpose. On pragmatic grounds, short maturities severely impact the creditworthiness of 
individual transactions since the rapid payback of principal sharply elevates debt service.   
 
For the most part, the long-term maturity needs of infrastructure investment have been 
met by the on-lending of donor funds, often at concessional interest rates and with long 
grace periods. However, credit enhancements can be used to lengthen effective maturities 
in developed markets, by employing late-maturity partial credit guarantees and their 
variants such as put options that are backed up by liquidity support funds41 Although not 
providing technically a liquidity facility, to some degree, INCA has acted in a similar 
capacity acting as a buyer of outstanding municipal bonds and providing re-financings.  
INCA’s “bad bond subsidiary,” NEWCO, buys troubled bonds for restructuring.  
NEWCO was made possible by donor-based capital, which allowed INCA to assist 
troubled credits without encumbering its own capital base.42 This “bad loan” approach 
might be a model for the PDAM loans in Indonesia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
41
 Upon the exercise of a put option by lenders, the options’ counter-party needs to pay out to the lenders as 
in the case of the guarantor.  When the party lacks adequate credit standing, its credit needs to be enhanced 
one way or another.  This technique has yet to be used, but is said to be under consideration in the case of 
TNUDF, which belatedly starting using a call option on its market offerings. 
42
 INCA’s publicly held bonds carry covenants that require its meeting capital adequacy requirements that 
restrict its ability to hold sub-par bonds in portfolio.    
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Table 4. Subnational Bonds Comparison 
 
Country Debt ServiceRatio Limit
Debt “Revenue” 
Limit Other Restrictions
Brazil Debt service cannot 
exceed 15 percent of  
total revenue or
operating surplus for 
previous year, 
whichever is less.
Borrowing cannot 
exceed 27 percent 
of  total “revenue” in 
approved budget.
• State governments cannot borrow 
f rom their own State bank;
• No new bond issues;
• Long -term credit only for investment;
• Restrictions on foreign -currency 
debt.
India None. None. • No borrowing in foreign currency;
• Long -term credit only for investment;
• Need case -by -case approval of  State 
gover nment for municipal loans or 
bonds.
Mexico None None • No borrowing in foreign currency
• Loans and bonds by states and local 
governments must be rated by rating 
companies (through bank regulation) 
• Loans/bonds are secured in 
intergovernmental payments
Philippines Debt service not to 
exceed 20 percent of  
“regular income” which 
includes inter -govern -
mental payments. Of  
those payments, not 
more than 20 percent 
can be used for de bt 
service, All LGU debt is 
ef fectively general 
obligation. Some 
special district 
borrowing (water).  
None • Bank loans for current and long -term 
investment needs.  Use of  intercept 
of  transfer payments as loan security
• Bonds are restricted to “self -
support ing” (revenue -producing) 
investments.
• Bond issues subject to central 
government review for meeting debt 
guidelines 
• Localities must budget for committed 
debt service payments for their 
budgets to be valid.   
Source:   Petersen and Soriano (2008) 
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